Environmental Justice in Kentucky: A County-Level Study of Enforcement of the Clean Air Act by Meade, Katherine
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
MPA/MPP Capstone Projects Martin School of Public Policy and Administration 
2014 
Environmental Justice in Kentucky: A County-Level Study of 
Enforcement of the Clean Air Act 
Katherine Meade 
University of Kentucky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds 
 Part of the Environmental Sciences Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public 
Administration Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Meade, Katherine, "Environmental Justice in Kentucky: A County-Level Study of Enforcement of the Clean 
Air Act" (2014). MPA/MPP Capstone Projects. 216. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds/216 
This Graduate Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Martin School of Public Policy 
and Administration at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in MPA/MPP Capstone Projects by an 
authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental Justice in Kentucky: A County-Level Study of Enforcement of 
the Clean Air Act 
 
 
Katherine Meade 
Capstone 2014 
1 
 
Background 
 
Environmental justice is the term coined by policy analysts interested in measuring 
the equity of exposure to toxic waste and pollution for citizens. The theory first gained 
traction in the 1980’s with the basic argument being that facilities creating pollution and 
managing hazardous waste are more likely to locate in areas with lower incomes and more 
minority citizens. The underlying assumption of the theory of environmental justice is that 
the voting population is not comprised of high percentages of the poor and minority 
population; therefore, politicians may face fewer political obstacles in allowing facilities to 
locate in areas where low-income and minority populations live. From an economic basis, 
inequitable exposure could be attributed to the lower cost of land in counties with low-
income citizens. This is an example of reverse causality and could also be the case that low-
income citizens may choose to live in areas with hazardous facilities because there is a 
lower cost of living and accept the risk associated with these facilities. This economic 
explanation has been questioned by academics who found that only some inequity in the 
location of facilities could be attributed to land cost.  
This economic argument will not be explored further as this paper does not look to 
study the possible inequitable placement of facilities. Instead, this paper studies the 
distribution of actions taken by state and federal officials to enforce environmental law. 
The reviewed literature frequently tests environmental equity by measuring if there is a 
higher likelihood of a hazardous facility being located in a low income area or an area with 
a greater number of minority households. The theory has developed beyond the placement 
of facilities to explore environmental equity as the study of the enforcement of 
environmental regulations in areas with concentrations of low income and minority 
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individuals. Again, because it is hypothesized that these areas are less likely to take political 
action, regulators may not ensure that federal regulations are being enforced, or may 
enforce them less often. It is the goal of this paper to measure enforcement in the state of 
Kentucky by county and examine whether there is a difference in the number of 
enforcements based on the income or racial characteristics of the county’s population.  
Environmental justice was first recognized in the federal government in an 
executive order from the Clinton administration. Issued in 1994, the order requires that 
agencies, “shall ensure that all programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance 
that affect human health or the environment do not directly, or through contractual or 
other arrangements, use criteria, methods, or practices that discriminate on the basis of 
race, color, or national origin” (Executive Order 12898). While recognition that inequalities 
might exist was an important first step for the environmental justice movement, the order 
did little to impact the processes and practices for the placement of facilities. Instead of 
acting as a guideline, the order was treated as more of a recommendation by the EPA and 
other federal agencies. However, it did establish environmental justice as an issue worthy 
of federal attention and would lay the groundwork for future regulation by the 
Environmental Protection Agency and other departments like Health and Human Services.  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the main agency with the authority 
to impose and responsibility to enforce environmental justice measures at the federal level. 
As a way to incorporate environmental justice into the EPA’s organizational structure and 
culture, the agency introduced Plan EJ 2014. The plan focuses on making environmental 
justice a core consideration for the EPA when decisions are made regarding permitting and 
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enforcement. There was also attention given to increasing efforts to educate the public and 
to build community-based programs that focus on environmental justice. The plan was 
created in 2010 with the hope that it would be implemented and in practice by 2014. 
Although Plan EJ 2014 seems to be a reasonable attempt to incorporate 
environmental justice concerns into the culture and practices of the EPA, a Government 
Accountability Office report on the progress of these efforts states “without additional 
progress on these practices, EPA cannot assure itself, its stakeholders, and the public that it 
has established a framework to effectively guide and assess its efforts to integrate 
environmental justice into the fabric of the agency” (GAO, 31). Changing the culture and 
everyday practices of an agency like the EPA is a difficult and complex undertaking and, 
realistically, cannot be accomplished in four years, particularly with recent changes in 
leadership. Plan EJ 2014 is the most comprehensive approach to come from the EPA in 
addressing environmental justice; however, it seems that practices which can result in 
environmental inequity might arise from more deeply imbedded patterns. The Health and 
Human Services strategy is similar to Plan EJ in that it relies largely on educating and 
empowering those communities that are, or would be, impacted by these facilities. Like the 
EPA’s strategy, this has the problem that there may be an inherent barrier of access for 
these communities where traditional programs may not reach the intended audience.  
Literature Review 
 
Academic articles in the field often come to opposing conclusions, and a great 
debate exists between those who find that minorities and low income populations face a 
disproportionate share of environmental damage and those who do not find that their data 
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supports such conclusions. This debate exists across studies that use location of pollution 
and toxic substances as the dependent variable as well as articles that use governmental 
enforcement of regulation as the dependent variable. Studies in environmental justice have 
focused on a variety of concerns including: location of facilities, cleanup efforts, and 
enforcement. The studies considered in this literature review all focus on the enforcement 
of regulations as the main focus of analysis.   
In the article, “Rush to judgment: An empirical analysis of environmental equity in 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency enforcement actions” Atlas critiques the findings and 
methodology of one National Law Journal article and improves upon the authors’ methods 
to recreate a study of enforcement (Atlas 2001).  The National Law Journal article and the 
Atlas article both focus on the EPA’s enforcement of environmental regulation in terms of 
litigation and subsequent penalties. Atlas concluded that minorities were not facing 
discrimination in environmental enforcement. Atlas is not the only academic to report 
such; some other studies that were structured similarly to his study reported similar 
results. This study helped lay the framework for further analysis of the quality of studies 
finding significant results. In order to compare results across studies, one must compare 
the quality of the methods employed by Atlas to other studies. This type of comparison in 
the literature can lead analysts to improved models to capture the possible existence of 
environmental injustice.  
Bowen and Wells (2002) focus their attention on the methodological limitations that 
plagued earlier environmental justice studies. Mainly, the authors report, these studies had 
limited data available and suffered from an inability to use one clear geographic unit of 
measurement. This issue regarding unit of analysis is discussed in further detail below 
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where the author will suggest additions to the county model to improve the overall study. 
As of 2002, Bowen and Wells report that, “The country's environmental justice research 
requirements include vastly increased data gathering and more, better empirical research” 
(Bowen & Wells, 696). While the data available to researches has come a long way from 
2002, the quality of the models employed by analysts remains problematic.  
Evan Ringquist is one expert in the field who has performed many time-series 
studies to test various theories of environmental justice. The findings from his studies 
consistently indicate that minorities do face discrimination in both the placement of 
facilities as well as in governmental enforcement of regulations. Recognizing the need to 
organize and make sense of the environmental justice literature, Ringquist performed a 
meta-analysis of the existing studies. (Ringquist 2005).  The author and his team sorted 
through the literature to identify studies with reliable statistical methods to include in his 
aggregated analysis. Once these studies were combined, Ringquist tested the probability of 
an environmental justice study finding significant results in terms of race and income. 
Ringquist states three conclusions can be drawn from the analysis, the most important 
being that “race-based environmental inequities exist, and this conclusion is unaffected by 
the type of risk examined, the level of aggregation employed, or the type of control 
variables used in the analysis” (Ringquist, 233). After comparing over 49 studies Ringquist 
comes to the conclusion that, regardless of the methods employed by the study, racial 
minorities do face discrimination. Ringquist, however, does not find that the same 
discrimination occurs based on economic class or income level.  
Recently, a study by David Konisky (2007) reported findings opposite to that of the 
Ringquist meta-analysis. Konisky found that lower income populations face a statistically 
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significant level of discrimination in environmental justice, in terms of the enforcement of 
federal regulations, whereas racial minorities do not. To find correlations within the data 
Konisky used a negative binomial regression, using each instance of enforcement of federal 
regulation as count data. For the study Konisky looked at the enforcement of the Clean Air 
Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Konisky’s 
use of the dependent variable of enforcement is less common in the literature, with fewer 
studies focusing on governmental action. The study includes data from state-level 
enforcement and provides the aggregate conclusion that state governments discriminate in 
their enforcement in lower-income counties.  
It is the goal of this paper to recreate the study conducted by Konisky using data 
from the Commonwealth of Kentucky, altering some of the independent or control 
variables included. To fit the specific characteristics of the state some variables are 
dropped and more appropriate ones added to test for the possibility of environmental 
inequity within the counties in terms of both EPA and state-level enforcements and 
inspections.  
Research Design 
 
 This study addresses the two following research questions. First, is there a 
difference between Kentucky counties in the number of inspections of registered facilities 
that can be significantly explained by the demographic characteristics of the county? In this 
research question, the author assumes the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between counties that can be explained by the demographic make-up of the county. The 
alternate hypothesis assumes that there is a significant difference in the number of 
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inspections occurring between counties. Second, is there a difference in the amount of 
enforcement action taken in counties based on the demographics of the county? The null 
hypothesis in the study would find there is no significant difference in the enforcement of 
these regulations and the alternative hypothesis that will be tested states that there is a 
statistically significant, negative difference in the enforcement of regulations in low 
income/high minority counties as compared to other counties. 
 The dependent variable in this study is a count variable of the inspections and 
enforcements of federal regulations of the Clean Air Act (CAA) by Kentucky officials and by 
those from the EPA. For this study “enforcement” refers to both formal and informal 
notices of violation of the CAA. These dependent variables were chosen because, while the 
placement of facilities may indicate former inequity, inspections and enforcement of 
regulation will test the possibility of current or ongoing inequity in counties with low 
incomes or high minority populations. The use of a count variable as the dependent 
variable necessitates the employment of a negative binomial regression for hypothesis 
testing. A negative binomial is appropriate in this case, as it was in Konisky’s study, because 
the counts cannot be considered independent of one another. If an inspection or 
enforcement action is taken in a county once, it can be assumed that enforcement action 
has a greater likelihood to occur again in the county.  
 Enforcement and inspections data come from the EPA through the Environmental 
Compliance History Online (ECHO) and reflect the past five years of EPA and state action in 
Kentucky counties. These data come from actions taken in 2008-2013 for each facility and 
are aggregated by county. The only facilities included in this study are those that have been 
designated as “major” facilities by the EPA, which is defined as “active, ‘federally-
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reportable’ sources” (ECHO). Smaller facilities have not been included in this study, and are 
not commonly included in the literature, because reporting of inspections and compliance 
for these facilities is often sporadic and does not provide enough data to make reliable 
assumptions regarding enforcement actions.  
 Data to account for the minority distribution within the county comes from the 2010 
Census by the U.S. Census Bureau. The variable indicates the proportion of non-white 
citizens within the county. This will be sufficient in this study as it is the goal to test 
discrimination against minorities overall, but not necessarily to test discrimination against 
specific races within the population. While other studies indicate that different ethnic 
groups may face different environmental inequities (Konisky, 2013) this study looks to 
gain an overall understanding of the impact on all non-white citizens. In order to measure 
income, two variables are included in the model: median household income and percentage 
of the population below the poverty line. It is important to include both variables because 
median income could be skewed by disparities in the distribution of wealth. The variable 
measuring poverty will provide a more accurate measure of the concentration of poverty 
within counties.   
 In addition to variables indicating population income and minority status, the model 
includes two variables to act as proxy measures of political capacity within the community. 
It was important to include these variables in the model because the underlying theory of 
environmental inequity suggests that low income/high minority communities face 
discrimination because of a bureaucratic incentive to be more responsive in a community 
that is more politically active (Konisky, 2013). As proxy indicators of political capacity the 
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data includes a measure of county voting behavior as well as one for the population’s 
education level. The voting variable is defined as the percentage of the county’s eligible 
voters who voted in the 2008 presidential election. This data was obtained from the 
Kentucky State Board of Elections. The education variable indicates the percent of a 
county’s population who are over the age of 25 and have at least a high school diploma or 
GED equivalent. Population, in thousands, is also included as a control in the models as it is 
expected that the more people present in the county the more likely an inspection and/or 
enforcement will occur.  
 Beyond these demographic variables and political capacity variables, three 
additional control variables are used in the model. One additional control included is a 
variable that accounts for the number of facilities in the county, as counties with more 
facilities are more likely to be regulated than counties with just a few. This variable comes 
from the EPA as a count of how many facilities operate in the county that have an Air ID 
and are required to comply with the CAA. This variable, along with the two variables 
measuring political capacity, are variables that come from the model introduced by 
Konisky’s study and their logical explanatory relationship to enforcement.  
 A major shortcoming acknowledged by Konisky article is the use of county as the 
unit of analysis in the model. Konisky explains that, because of the mixed size of counties, 
heterogeneity within counties, and lack of exact locations of facilities and populations with 
particular characteristics, there are definite limitations to using county-level data. Konisky 
continues with this unit of analysis, however, because that is the industry standard and the 
EPA data used only exists in a county-level format. In an attempt to address issues with 
county-level data, the current model includes a variable indicating whether the county is 
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considered a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The final variable the model includes as a 
control is a dummy variable identifying “coal counties” within the state. This variable is 
included and is important to consider for a coal-producing state like Kentucky because the 
large coal industry represents many jobs and a powerful lobby. It is the author’s 
assumption that the existence of major coal facilities in a county could impact the 
likelihood that the state will enforce the CAA. These seven explanatory variables should 
create a good fit for the model in predicting the number of enforcement actions taken by 
the state government. The variables explained for the models are given by the regression 
equations below. 
 
Model One: Inspections 
Regression Equation 
Inspections= constant + nonwhite + median income + poverty 
rate + population + land area + voter turnout + education + 
number of facilities + MSA + coal + error term 
Model Two: Enforcement 
Regression Equation 
Enforcement= constant + nonwhite + median income + poverty 
rate + population + land area + voter turnout + education + 
number of facilities + MSA + coal + inspections + error term 
 
Results and Interpretations  
 The results of this study vary substantially from the literature and may provide 
unique insights into environmental justice in Kentucky. Of the 120 counties in Kentucky, 78 
of the counties had at least one facility with an EPA Air ID. The 42 counties that did not 
have a facility are not included in the regression model, as it is illogical to expect there 
would be no inspections or enforcements of facilities in these counties. The number of 
inspections varies greatly, ranging from as few as one inspection to a high of 423 
inspections in the last five years. The enforcement variable also varies, less so than 
inspections, with one to 131 enforcements in different counties. The US Census data 
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included in this study - regarding race, income, population, and education – are described 
in Table One below.  
Table One: Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Inspections 120 26.63 10.5 52.56 
Enforcements 120 7.45 1 17.63 
Number of Facilities 120 2.51 1 4.56 
Population 120 36,161.39 18,751 74,122.76 
Median Income 120 $37,922.73 $37,648.50 $10,151.65 
Percent Below Poverty Line 120 21.3% 19.8% 6.9% 
Percent Nonwhite 120 8.1% 6.1% 6.1% 
Percent Hispanic 120 2.2% 1.7% 1.6% 
Percent High School Education 120 77.5% 77.9% 7.4% 
Percent Voter Turnout 120 60.2% 61.5% 6.9% 
Land Area (Square Miles) 120 329.05 305.89 129.14 
 
 As shown in the table above, enforcements and inspections have high standard 
deviations due to the few counties with high counts. By looking at the medians, the 
distribution of these variables is easier to discern. When running both models, the only 
county observations that are included are those with at least one facility in the county. The 
demographic variables appear as expected from census data, given known historical trends 
and variations. The variables measuring coal and MSA are dummy variables, meaning 1 is 
assigned if the county is designated a coal-producing county or an MSA, and a 0 is assigned 
if not. Table Two contains the frequency counts for the two dummy variables, coal and 
MSA.  
Table Two: Frequencies of Dummy Variables 
 Frequency Percent 
Coal-Producing   
0 92 76.67% 
1 28 23.33% 
Coal Total 120 100% 
MSA   
0 86 71.67% 
1 34 28.33% 
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MSA Total 120 100% 
 
 The first model defined inspections as the dependent variable, controlling for all the 
variables described above - excluding enforcements and the size of the Hispanic or Latino 
population in a community as variables to be discussed in following models. Table Three, 
given below, shows the results of the negative binomial regression testing the count of 
inspections while holding all other variables constant, given that there is at least one 
eligible facility in the county.  
 Table Three: Inspections Model Results 
 Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
Number of Facilities 0.210 *** 0.023 
Population (In Thousands) -0.008 *** 0.001 
Median Income (In Thousands) 0.006  0.017 
Percent Below Poverty Line 7.602 *** 2.967 
Percent Nonwhite 0.139  1.413 
Coal -0.043  0.221 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) 0.475 *** 0.181 
Percent High School Education 5.301 ** 2.533 
Percent Voter Turnout 4.835 ** 2.290 
Land Area (Square Miles) 0.001  0.001 
Constant -6.536  2.402 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
When the number of facilities in a county increases, the expected number of 
inspections will significantly increase, holding all other variables constant (p<0.01). This 
finding is consistent with expectations, as an increased number of facilities would require 
increased inspections within the county. Another important finding in the inspections 
model comes from the population predictor variable. For a one thousand person increase 
in the population, there is a highly significant decrease in the number of inspections in the 
county, controlling for all other variables (p<0.01). This finding is does not align with the 
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beginning assumptions that a population increase would, in-turn, increase the number of 
inspections in the county.  
Two variables that were expected to affect the number of inspections, median 
income and percentage of nonwhite citizens did not yield significant results. This indicates 
that the race variable and one of the income variables did not influence the likelihood of an 
inspection for the given county, holding all else constant. However, the second income 
variable included in the model, representing the percent of the population below the 
poverty line, is found to be a significant predictor. According to the model, a one percent 
increase in the population below the poverty line will increase the number of inspections in 
the county, holding all other variables constant (p<0.01). This finding is opposite of what 
some of the literature suggests and could be attributed to increased efforts to reverse 
environmental inequities or could suggest that environmental injustice, in terms of 
inspections, does not exist in Kentucky or cannot be captured due to limitations within the 
model. Possibilities for this finding and implications for future research will be discussed 
further in a later section of this paper.  
The two variables included in the model to gauge political participation, voter 
turnout and high school education, are both moderately significant in these findings. In this 
regression, a one percent increase in the number of citizens (over 25 years old) with a high 
school education will result in a moderately significant increase in expected inspections, 
holding all else constant (p<0.05). Similarly, a one percent increase in voter turnout will 
increase the number of inspections with moderate significance, ceteris paribus (p<0.05).  
These political participation variables may be capturing the bureaucratic incentives to be 
more active, in CAA inspections in counties that are more politically involved.  
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The variable that accounts for a MSA is also significant in this model. Counties that 
contain a MSA have a highly significant relationship with the dependent variable that 
increases the count of inspections as compared to those counties that do not have a MSA 
(p<0.01). This is an interesting finding in comparison to the results from the population 
variable and may indicate that population density could be a better predictor of CAA 
inspections. The variables that account for coal and land area do not yield significant 
results in the inspections model.  
The second model in this study switches from a focus on inspections and instead 
looks at the number of enforcements within a county in the past five years. One addition to 
this model is the variable Inspections Squared. This transformed version of the inspections 
variable is included because of the non-linear relationship between inspections and 
enforcements. Table Four gives the discrete change values of the inspections in terms of 
their relationship to the dependent variable enforcements.  
Table Four: Discrete Change in Enforcements 
Inspections Predicted 
Enforcements 
Predicted Enforcements for 
Inspections + 1 
Discrete Change 
0 0 0.08 0.08 
50 10.09 10.16 0.07 
100 16.14 16.19 0.05 
150 20.78 20.81 0.03 
200 21.54 21.55 0.01 
250 17.97 17.98 0.01 
300 12.07 12.07 0.00 
350 6.53 6.53 0.00 
 
As the first inspections occur it is predicted that there will be enforcement action 
taken in the county. However as inspections increase the expected number of resulting 
enforcements does not increase at the same rate, slowing down as more and more 
inspections are conducted. This relationship provides a basic insight into the interaction 
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between monitoring and penalizing facilities. After a certain point it seems, inspections 
could be conducted and no enforcement is necessary due to eventual compliance with the 
CAA. Another possibility for this is that inspections are being conducted on repeatedly 
offending facilities but enforcement action is not taken because it has not been effective in 
changing the behavior of the inspected facility. These are not the only possible explanations 
for the relationship between inspections and enforcements; other factors may be 
contributing to the nonlinearity of these two variables.  
Table Five, below, contains the results of the negative binomial regression for the 
model using enforcements as the dependent variable. Both inspections (original and 
transformed) are included here with highly significant relationships with enforcement in 
opposite directions.  
Table Five: Enforcements Model Results 
 Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
Inspections 0.018 *** 0.006 
Inspections Squared -0.001 *** 0.001 
Number of Facilities 0.244 *** 0.067 
Population (In Thousands) -0.007 * 0.004 
Median Income (In Thousands) 0.032  0.025 
Percent Below Poverty Line 5.007  4.457 
Percent Nonwhite -1.556  1.817 
Coal -0.904 *** 0.348 
Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA) 
-0.088  0.280 
Percent High School Education 7.280 * 3.967 
Percent Voter Turnout -3.689  3.434 
Land Area (Square Miles) .001  0.001 
Constant -5.262  3.944 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 Like the first model, this shows a significant negative relationship between 
population and the number of enforcements in a county, indicating that the number of 
citizens may not translate to the number of regulatory actions for a county; however, 
population size in this model is only significant if the p-value is increased to a 0.1 chance of 
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error, from the 0.01 probability found in the data on inspections. Again, race does not 
appear to have any kind of significant relationship with the number of enforcements of the 
CAA. Also, in this enforcements model, neither measure of income appears to have a 
relationship with the number of enforcements. This is unexpected, as before, because the 
literature would suggest race or income may be a significant predictor of enforcement 
activity. Based on this model, this is not the case for federal and state enforcement of 
environmental regulations in Kentucky counties over the last five years.  
 One particularly interesting variable from this regression output is the dummy 
variable for coal. In this model, coal has a highly significant negative relationship with 
enforcements (p<0.01). This indicates that, within the parameters of this study, counties 
that are identified as “coal counties” are less likely to experience enforcement of the CAA. 
One possible explanation for this finding, which is not controlled for in the model, is the 
consideration that coal counties have different geographic features that make EPA or state 
action less likely in the county. The problem with this theory is that being a coal county is 
not significantly related to inspections in the first model. If land features specific to these 
counties prevented enforcement action, it would follow they should also prevent inspection 
actions.  An alternate explanation for the significant negative relationship between coal 
counties and enforcements could be a political one. In Kentucky, the coal lobby has been 
criticized as having the power to help shape regulatory legislation that impacts production 
and mining jobs. There is no evidence included in this model to confirm this possible 
political explanation of reduced enforcements in coal counties. Further research may 
include controls for political factors within the counties in order to test if the relationship is 
changed when controlling for politics.  
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 Both of these models were also run after changing the race variable from the 
percent of nonwhite citizens in a county to the percent of Hispanic/Latino citizens in the 
county, as some literature suggests there is a growing concern about environmental 
inequality for Hispanic and Latino communities (Konisky 2013). The results again 
indicated no significant effect on inspections or enforcements to the racial makeup of the 
county.  
Recommendations  
 The findings of this study could signal the possibility of important developments in 
the topic of environmental justice. With the data available and given the models employed 
by this study, it seems that environmental inequality, as defined by number of inspections 
and enforcements, is not an issue among the counties of Kentucky based on their 
demographic characteristics. It is impossible to say if this study reflects an improvement in 
environmental equity considering there are no prior studies of the topic in the state to 
provide a comparison. There are at least two possible explanations for these findings: 
environmental justice has never been an issue in the state or efforts to improve equity on 
the state and federal levels have been successful. It could be the case that there has not 
been a problem, in Kentucky, in equal governance of the CAA in the last five years. This 
finding could also indicate success in efforts to improve equity across all counties, but again 
without a baseline comparison preceding this study the author cannot definitively draw 
this conclusion. What can be concluded from this study is that governance, in terms of 
inspections, seems to be more responsive to counties with a high percent of the population 
below the poverty line. This is an encouraging finding considering the body of literature 
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that would suggest that this would not be the case. The racial makeup of the county also 
has no relationship with the number of inspections or enforcements in the county.  This 
could be because the state of Kentucky is not particularly diverse; there is little racial 
variation among Kentucky counties, with most counties as predominately white, which 
could explain this finding.  
 This study could be an indicator of a state with equitable governance of 
environmental justice. To further confirm this possibility, a future study would expand 
beyond the CAA and look at the enforcement of legislation like the Clean Water Act and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act across facilities in the state. Future studies of 
environmental justice in Kentucky should also attempt to find controls that explain this 
significant relationship of reduced enforcements in coal counties. If the relationship can be 
explained by a lobbying or political variable, the state will need to consider the implications 
of reduced enforcement for coal counties. There is the possibility of terrain as an 
explanatory factor for some of the relationship between coal counties and governance and 
future studies should look to control for this geographic difference.  
Caveats 
 As explained before, this study does not control for terrain, which could explain the 
highly significant relationship between coal production and reduced enforcements. The 
author questions this possibility, however, because the number of inspections is not 
affected by the presence of coal within a county. The author again must note that the 
number of counties with facilities with an Air ID and regulated by the CAA is only 78, 
leaving this study with a relatively small sample size. In order to draw conclusions about 
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environmental justice overall in the state, this sample must be widened to include other 
legislation and facilities with water IDs. This study can lay the framework for future studies 
in the state and provides the hopeful possibility that governance appears to be equitable in 
counties, regardless of income or race. Another common issue in environmental justice 
literature that this study looks to help resolve is the problem with using county as a unit of 
measurement. Often, when using counties it is difficult to interpret the data in counties that 
contain a large city where the population is dense. The inclusion of the MSA variable is the 
author’s attempt at controlling for this, however MSA does not account for counties with 
relatively large urban areas, which could be a factor in an environmental justice study. 
Future research may find that using Micropolitan Statistical Areas may help account for 
cities that still contribute to population density, but are not large enough to be MSAs.  
Summary 
 This study of environmental justice in Kentucky is only the beginning for research 
on this issue. Kentucky does not appear to have an inequitable distribution of governance 
activities, as indicated by inspections and enforcements, for the CAA in last five years in 
terms of race. Considering income and inspections, the state and the EPA seem to be more 
responsive in counties with a larger percent of the population below the poverty line. This 
could be because facilities in more impoverished areas require more inspections because 
the facilities are operating in a more polluting manner than other facilities in higher income 
communities. However, the presence of coal in a county significantly reduces the likelihood 
of a CAA enforcement in that county but it does not have a relationship with the number of 
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inspections in that county. These conclusions indicate, more than anything, the need for 
further study of environmental justice in the state of Kentucky.  
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